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should focus on the evidence presented during trial in light of the requirement that such evidence be clear and convincing.
MARY CASE DOESBURG

SCOPE OF SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST:
MISSOURI'S APPLICATION OF
THE EXCEPTION
State v. Brasel'
The defendant, Ronald E. Brasel, registered at a St. Louis motel under
an assumed name. Mr. Armstrong, the motel manager, received information from motel employees that there were drugs in defendant's room.
After viewing the room, he telephoned the police to report having observed a large quantity of bottled pills and capsules (many with federal warrants) in defendant's room. Thirty minutes later the police arrived and
were shown one registration card bearing "Ronald Bradley" and a license
number. Officers then viewed defendant's room firsthand. A later check
on the license number revealed the car was registered to "Ronald Brasel."
The officiers waited in an adjoining room and knocked on Brasel's
judge sat as factfinder. The statement would apply as well to legal claims where it is
the jury which must be clearly convinced. However, this did not mean there could
be no evidence to the contrary. The court added that "[t]he word 'cogent'...
means impelling, appealing to one's reason, or convincing." Id. at 86. No other
Missouri cases were found defining the phrase. Perhaps the most definitive judicial
statement regarding the meaning of phrases such as "clear, precise and indubitable," or "clear and convincing," or "clear and satisfactory" is that of the court in
Tapler v. Frey, 184 Pa. Super. Ct. 239, 244-45, 132 A.2d 890, 893 (1957):
[These phrases] have a technical meaning which is that the witnesses must
be found to be credible, that the facts to which they have testified are
distinctly remembered and the details thereof narrated exactly and in due
order, and that their testimony is so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable either a judge or a jury to come to a clear conviction,
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
These definitions should aid attorneys in preparing closing arguments. If the
meaning of "clear and convincing" is properly explained to the jury, they will have
little difficulty in understanding the state of mind they should have in order to find
the higher burden of proof has been met. The definitions indicate that the jury
should be "clearly convinced." They should be able to form the belief needed to
return a verdict for the party with the burden of proof with less doubt and
hesitancy than in other types of civil cases.
1. 538 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. En Banc 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 639 (1976).
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door after he returned. When he opened it, one of the five officers
displayed his badge and asked to enter. According to the officer's testimony, Brasel indicated they could come in. 2 Upon request, defendant
showed identification and was then placed under arrest.' A frisk revealed a
quantity of pills in Brasel's trouser pocket, and the search of an attache case
sitting on a chair about four feet from defendant resulted in the discovery
of thirty-one amphetamine capsules.
Brasel was charged with two counts of unlawful possession of controlled substances.4 Count I was based on the possession of the pills found
in his pockets, and Count II was based on pills in the attache case. Defendant was convicted before the St. Louis County Circuit Court on both
counts. 5 The St. Louis District of the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction on Count I, but reversed and remanded on Count 1.6 The
Missouri Supreme Court, deciding the case as though on direct appeal,
affirmed the convictions on both counts.7 The court found that there was
probable cause for the warrantless arrest' and that the search of the
attache case was within the scope of search incident to
defendant and the
9
this lawful arrest.
The search incident to arrest exception allows a search without a
warrant of an arrestee and an area around him when the search is incident
2. The case presents a situation where officers entered a private room to
make a warrantless arrest when they had ample time to secure a warrant. The court
did not have to face the question of the propriety of such an act, for the court
decided that the defendant consented to the officers' entry; however, judicial
controversy has arisen over the issue of whether the fourth amendment precludes
entry by officers into a private dwelling to effect a warrantless arrest. The United
States Supreme Court has not fully resolved the question. See generally United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); United States v. Santana, 96 S. Ct. 2406 (1976).
Recently the California Supreme Court held that absent exigent circumstances such
arrest was forbidden by the fourth amendment. People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263,
545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1976). Missouri cases have allowed entries to
make warrantless arrests without the arrestee's consent if the officer has given
notice of his purpose and has been refused admittance. State v. Tomlin, 467 S.W.2d
918 (Mo. 1971); State v. Novak, 428 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. 1968), State v. Vineyard, 497
S.W.2d 821 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1973). Section 544.200 RSMo 1969, provides for
entry to make "arrests" under these circumstances.
3. The lawfulness of a warrantless arrest must be based on probable cause.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Brasel court concluded that
probable cause may be based upon legally obtained information, independent of
that illegally gained, when both are within the knowledge of the officer. In Brasel
the police legally gained information from the motel manager and the license
check. However, the information they obtained from their own viewing of the room
was the result of an illegal entry and could not be a basis for probable cause to
arrest.
4. 538 S.W.2d at 326.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 327.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 331.
9. Id. at 332.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/12
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to a lawful, custodial arrest. The exception was first articulated in dictum
referring to search of "the person."'0 It was expanded to include search of
the person and the "place where the arrest is made,""1 and under its
broadest interpretation allowed a search of both the arrestee and the
"premises" where the arrest occurred. 1 2 In 1969, the Supreme Court decided Chimel v. California,'3 overruling earlier decisions and limiting the
scope of search incident to arrest.
The Chimel decision limited the scope of search to the person of the
arrestee and the area "within which he might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence."' 4 The Court held that protection of the officer,
prevention of a means of escape, and preservation of evidence justify this
exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement.'The Missouri Supreme Court held that the search in Brasel did fall
within the limits prescribed by Chimel. 16 There are significant features in
the court's interpretation of what is "within" the arrestee's "immediate
control." Attention should first be focused on the court's approach to who
bears the burden of proving the search incident to arrest exception. Both
federal and Missouri cases have held that the burden of proving an exception to the search warrant requirement is on those seeking exemption from
it.' 7 However, in Brasel, the court failed to make the state bear this entire
burden. In concluding that the attache case was within the defendant's
control, the court stated:
The evidence indicated that the attache case was on a chair
perhaps four feet from the defendant . . . .There were other
officiers in the room at the time, but no evidence was introduced
that they were so placed that it was impossible for defendant to
reach and enter the attache case. At some point, defendant was
handcuffed but the evidence does not show that this had occurred
prior to search of the attache case. On the record before us, we
cannot conclude that defendant could not, by a quick movement,
reach the attache case and obtain a wea1 on concealed therein or
destroy evidence contained in the case. ?
10. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
11. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
12. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). Rabinowitz allowed the
thorough warrantless search of a one-room office as a search incident to arrest. The
test used was not whether it was reasonable to procure a warrant, Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), but whether the search itself was reasonable. In
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), the Court upheld the warrantless
search of a four-room apartment as one incident to arrest.
13. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
14. Id. at 763.
15. Id. at 764.
16. 538 S.W.2d at 332.
17. United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Van
Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich. 1976); State v. Sutton, 454 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. En
Banc 1970).
18. 538 S.W.2d at 332.
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The only evidence introduced by the state was that the distance between
defendant and the attache case was four feet. No evidence was introduced
as to defendant's actual ability to reach the case; i.e., there was no showing
by the state of the officers' position in relation to the defendant nor of
when Brasel was restrained by handcuffs. By requiring the state to prove
only that the arrest was lawful and that the case was four feet from the
arrestee, the court effectively shifted the burden to the defendant to prove
that the search did exceed the permissible bounds. Such a view did not
apply the general rule that the exception is to be proven by the one
invoking it.
Requiring the state to prove only distance rather than the arrestee's
actual ability to gain access to the item is to adopt an "area 19 or "physical
proximity" 20 approach to the determination of the scope incident to arrest.
The area test focuses on the arrestee's "hypothetical ability to reach the
area searched,'
without regard to his actual ability to do so. This approach sacrifices the rationale of Chimel, which was to limit the scope of the
search to the justification for the search. If there is no real danger of the
arrestee gaining access to weapons, evidence, or a means of escape, then
the distance between him and the item becomes immaterial. Thus, it can be
argued that the area test differs only in degree from pre-Chimel, propertyrelated decisions that allowed a search of the "premises," 22 and that there is
still license for exploratory searches, albeit ones of substantially delimited
23
parameters.
Also apparent from Brasel and previous Missouri opinions is the fact
that Missouri courts have failed to recognize that challenged searches may
occur in three different situations: at the time of the arrest of the person,
after the person has been taken into custody and restrained, and when
special circumstances are involved; e.g., where an arrestee will be allowed
to drive himself to the police station after the arrest. Missouri courts have
treated these three situations as involving the same problem, failing to
realize that each calls for a different solution to the determination of what
is within the scope of search.
In the situation involving special circumstances such as those existing
when police intend to allow an arrestee to drive to the station, there is
justification for a search of the area in the car within his immediate control
even if the driver is out of the car. The search is justified because it
19. Cook, Warrantless Searches Incident to Arrest, 24 ALA. L. REV. 607, 621
(1972).
20. Comment, The PermissibleScope of a PremisesSearch Incident to Arrest Under
Chimel v. California: Divergent Definitions of "Immediate Control" Plague the Lower
Courts, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 350, 356 (1976).
21. Id.
22. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United
States 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
23. Cook, supra note 19, at 622.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss4/12
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prevents his gaining access to weapons or evidence when he gets back into
the auto. This is true despite the arrestee's inability to reach the items at the
time of the search.
Another situation exists in a search made when there are no special
circumstances and the person has been arrested but not restrained. If the
state establishes that the arrest was lawful and that the search was made
when there has been only an arrest, the hypothetical ability of the arrestee
to reach the item is important, and proof as to distance is indicative of what
is within his immediate control. In the Brasel case, the state did offer
evidence of distance, and other Missouri decisions have likewise recognized
that the state bears the burden of proving distance. In State v. Wiley 24 the
defendant followed officers to the doorway of a kitchen where they seized
controlled substances from a refrigerator. The court, in holding the search
not incident to arrest stated: "There is no showing that the persons were so
near the refrigerator that the search and seizure of the substance could be a
lawful search incident to arrest. ' '25 In a similar case, the search of a dresser
drawer in the bedroom where defendant was arrested was struck down.
The court said that the only person present in the room when the search
began was defendant's wife, and there was no showing by the state that she
was "close enough to the dresser. . . that she might have been able to grab
a weapon or destructible evidence."26 These decisions emphasize the importance the Missouri courts place on distance in deciding what is within an
arrestee's immediate control. Where only an arrest has occurred, the distance or area the arrestee can hypothetically reach is properly the issue.
Missouri courts have treated the situation where the person has been
taken into custody and restrained as involving the same problem as
where only an arrest has occurred and have employed the area approach
despite the arrestee's inability to actually reach an item. When the arrestee
has been restrained, the rationale for allowing a search of the area, which
exists where there has been only an arrest of the person, is no longer
present. However, in regard to what must be proven by the state, Missouri
courts have failed to distinguish the two situations. In State v. Kent27
defendant was arrested while claiming three suitcases from a taxi stand at a
train station.2' He was then taken to a security office at the station where
one suitcase was opened. The others were opened later at police headquarters. The defendant argued that at the time of the search he was under
police guard, had been manacled, and was separated from the cases. The
court rejected his contention and cited State v. Boyd.29 Boyd upheld a search
24. 522 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
25. Id. at 290.
26. State v. Funk, 490 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Mo. App., D.K.G. 1973).
27. 535 S.W.2d 545 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
28. It is not clear from the facts whether he had actually gotten physical
possession of the suitcases he was attempting to claim. Id. at 547.
29. 492 S.W.2d 787 (Mo. 1973).
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incident to arrest as within the Chimel rule when an attache case was taken
from the defendant upon his arrest and not examined until he was led 150
feet from the case. Other Missouri cases have reached similar results."0
The Brasel court possibly was faced with a situation like those above
where more than an arrest occurred; however, they chose to require the
state to offer evidence only as to distance and to place upon the defendant
the burden of proving that the case was not within his immediate control.
Chief Judge Seiler's dissenting opinion recognized that more was involved
than a search carried out when only arrest of the person had occurred. He
suggested that in deciding what was within the arrestee's immediate control, the burden be upon the state to show that he could have actually
reached the item.3 1 This would make the state bear the entire burden of
proving the exception to the warrant requirement and would force the
court to review the actual circumstances, a requirement more in keeping
with the intent of Chimel. Chief Judge Seiler's suggestion would mesh well
with what commentators have termed the "factual analysis"3 2 or "purposive" 3 approach to defining what is within an arrestee's immediate
control. It focuses on his actual ability to reach a particular item in light of
the facts presented.3 4 This test recognizes that Chimel sought to make a
change in purpose, not mere degree, and would limit the exception to the
justification for it. In reviewing the facts, the courts would examine the
number of officers present, the position of the officers in relation to the
arrestee, the physical restraints placed on the arrestee, and the physical
35
abilities peculiar to him.
The Brasel case was before the St. Louis Court of Appeals before
transfer to the supreme court. The court of appeals found that the search
of the briefcase was not incident to the arrest within the meaning of
Chimel. The opinion reflects an adherence to the factual analysis approach.
The court referred to the rationale underlying the Chimel decision, and
approached the question of the scope of search from a practical standpoint
and in "terms of accessibility."3 Quoting from United States v. Jones,37 the
court stated:
In essence, the approach to a claim that a search was incident to an
arrest is for the court to examine the facts and make an objective
determination of a rather subjective question: could the law enforcement officials on the scene reasonably expect the arrested
30.
Venezia,
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

State v. McCollum, 527 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975); State v.
515 S.W.2d 492 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
538 S.W.2d at 333.
Comment, supra note 20, at 357.
Cook, supra note 19, at 621.
Comment, supra note 20, at 357.
Id. at 368.
State v. Brasel, No. 36032 (Mo. App., D. St. L., July 22, 1975).
475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973).
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person to gain hold of a weapon or evidence in the area
searched."8
Deciding whether officials could "reasonably expect" the defendant to gain
access to weapons or evidence within the area searched necessarily requires
a factual analysis approach. In showing this reasonable expectation, the
burden would be on the state to show the arrestee could have reached an
item.
In Brasel the supreme court chose neither to follow the recommendations of Chief Judge Seiler nor those of the court of appeals, despite the
fact that their reasoning followed the intent of Chimel. The court instead
adopted an area approach. Thus, while officers will be limited to an area
which they may search, the opinion would seem to nearly eliminate the
necessity of determining whether lives or evidence were actually in danger
or of distinguishing between a search carried out when only arrest of the
person had occurred and one done after the person had been restrained. A
possible extension of the opinion would eliminate the need for the arrestee's presence at the time of the search; i.e., the police might return later
and search a hypothetical area radiating from the point where the arrest
occurred. The opinion will affect the burden of proof placed on prosecutors, and this area approach, which will result in upholding more searches,
will affect police conduct to the extent that the exclusionary rule can be said
to do so." While the decision may mean the conviction of more offenders,
the supreme court has paid only lip service to Chimel in reaching a resultoriented decision.
BOBETTE SANDERS

38. State v. Brasel, No. 36032 (Mo. App., D. St. L., July 22, 1975). The dissent
in the Brasel opinion in the court of appeals expressed sentiments like those of the
majority opinion of the Missouri Supreme Court. The dissent stated that the
briefcase was within the defendant's immediate control and that there was no
showing that he could not have reached for weapons or destroyed evidence. This
reasoning again places the burden on the defendant to prove that he could not have
reached weapons or evidence.
39. Courts have stated that the exclusionary rule deters police from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656
(1961). However, other authorities have stated that the rule deters police conduct
only in certain instances or not at all. See Canon, Is The Exclusionary Rule in Failing
Health Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 KY L. J. 681
(1974); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV.
665 (1970); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-SeizurePracticesin
Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J. OF L. & SOC. PROBS. 87 (1968).
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